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ON THE DIVINE NATURE AND THE 
NATURE OF DIVINE FREEDOM 
Thomas B. Talbott 
In my paper, I defend a view that many would regard as self-evidently false: the view 
that God's freedom, his power to act, is in no way limited by his essential properties. I 
divide the paper into five sections. In section i, I call attention to a special class of 
non-contingent propositions and try to identify an important feature of these propositions; 
in section ii, I provide some initial reasons. based in part upon the unique features of 
these special propositions, for thinking that God does have the power to perform actions 
which his essential properties entail he will never perform; in section iii, I call into 
question the assumption that a person has the power to do something only if it is logically 
possible that he will exercise that power; and, finally, in sections iv and v, I try to specify 
a sense in which divine freedom and the kind of human freedom required by the Free 
will Defense are in fact the same kind of freedom. 
If God is a necessary being and in possession of certain essential properties of 
the sort that an Anselmian would attribute to him, then a good many unexpected 
propositions will tum out to be necessarily true and a good many others necessarily 
false. Take, for instance, 
(I) There exists a favorable balance of good over evil 
and 
(2) At the year 2000 every creature will begin an eternity of endless 
torment. 
If God exists in all possible worlds and is both omnipotent and loving in all 
possible worlds, then it may tum out that (1) is true and (2) is false in all possible 
worlds. So it may turn out that (1) is necessarily true and (2) is necessarily false. 
But if (1) is necessarily true, does it follow that God is somehow powerless to 
bring it about that (1) is false?-and if (2) is necessarily false, does it follow 
that God is powerless to bring it about that (2) is true? In this paper, I shall 
argue that no such consequences follow. I shall argue that, with respect to a 
special class of necessarily true propositions, God does have the (unexercised) 
power to bring it about that these propositions are false; and similarly. with 
respect to a special class of necessarily false propositions, he has the (unexercised) 
power to bring it about that these propositions are true. What is at stake here, of 
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course, is how one should conceive of divine freedom and, more generally, how 
one should conceive of the freedom of any agent. Even compatibilists, after all, 
are apt to assume that an agent S is free with respect to an action A only if it 
is logically possible that S does A and logically possible that S refrains from A. 
But in this paper I shall call into question that assumption, at least in so far as 
it applies to God. I shall suggest that God's freedom, his power to act, is in no 
way limited by his essential properties; for though his essential properties do 
entail that he will not act in certain ways and do entail that there is no possible 
world in which he acts in certain ways, they do not entail that he is powerless 
to act in those ways. 
J should perhaps say at the outset that I fully appreciate how absurd my thesis 
is apt to appear, at least initially. Isn't it just obvious, just self-evident, that no 
one has the power to actualize a logically impossible state of affairs? According 
to most philosophers, this is indeed self-evident. In an exceptionally fine discus-
sion of divine omnipotence, for instance, Thomas P. Flint and Alfred J. Freddoso 
write: 
Our second condition [of adequacy for allY analysis of omnipotence] is 
that an omnipotent being should be expected to have the power to 
actualize a state of affairs p only if it is logically possible that someone 
actualize p, i.e., only if there is a possible world W such that in W 
someone actualizes p. We take this claim to be self-evident.' 
I shall argue, however, that what Flint and Freddoso (and many others) take to 
be self-evident is not only not self-evident but quite false. I shall divide the 
discussion into five sections. In section i, I shall call attention to a special class 
of non-contingent propositions and try to identify an important feature of these 
propositions; in section ii, I shall provide some initial reasons, based in part 
upon the unique features of these special propositions, for thinking that God 
does have the power to perform actions which his essential properties entail he 
will never perform; in section iii, I shall call into question the assumption that 
a person has the power to do something only if it is logically possible that he 
will exercise that power; and, finally, in sections iv and v, I shall try to specify 
a sense in which divine freedom and the kind of human freedom required by 
the Free Will Defense are in fact the same kind of freedom. 
Thanks to the work of Alvin Plantinga in particular, we no longer make the 
mistake of assuming that God (an essentially omnipotent being) can actualize 
just any possible state of affairs or bring about the truth of just any contingent 
proposition. 2 But most contemporary philosophers do, I believe, make a mistake 
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in the opposite direction; they assume (incorrectly, I believe) that even God is 
powerless to actualize an impossible state of affairs or to bring it about that a 
necessarily false proposition is in fact tme. That assumption is, of course, a very 
natural one and one that I have always made in the past; indeed, I still make it 
with respect to a particular class of impossible states of affairs and a particular 
class of necessarily false propositions. Unlike some Cartesians, perhaps, I assume 
that not even God could create a square circle or a material object without spatial 
dimensions, and not even God could bring it about that 
(3) 2 + 2 = 5 
is in fact true. I assume, furthermore, that no one, not even God, brings it about 
that (3) is false either, nor does anyone bring it about that 
(4) 2 + 2 = 4 
is true. A necessary falsehood such as (3) is simply false in all possible worlds, 
and there is no world W in which some agent in W actually brings it about that 
(3) is false; and similarly for (4): (4) is simply true in all possible worlds, and 
there is no world W' in which some agent in W' actually brings it about that 
(4) is true. 
But (1) and (2) above are, it seems, quite different from (3) and (4) in this 
regard. If (1) is true at all in the actual world, it is true (given our assumptions 
about God) for this reason: in the actual world God brings it about that (1) is 
true. Indeed, the means by which God brings this about in the actual world will 
be quite different from those by which he brings this about in some other possible 
world. In the actual world, for instance, God has presumably created persons 
with the capacity to enjoy sexual pleasure, and this may in fact contribute to the 
truth of (1); but in other worlds, we may safely assume, he will eschew this 
means altogether. And consider this oddity. By performing an action (or set of 
actions) in the actual world, God may bring it about that (1) is true, but he could 
hardly thereby bring it about that (1) is true in all other possible worlds. So if 
(1) is necessarily true, God does not bring it about that (1) is necessarily true; 
he simply acts in the actual world so as to bring it about that (1) is true. Of 
course in every world in which he exists (which is every world) God does 
guarantee the truth of (1); so we can say, perhaps, that the necessity of (I) rests 
in some way upon the nature or character of God. But since God can do nothing 
in the actual world to guarantee that (1) is true in all other possible worlds, he 
evidently does not bring it about that (1) is necessarily true, though he does 
bring it about that (1) is true. 3 
Now similar remarks can be made concerning the falsity of (2). Even if (2) 
is necessarily false, it is God who arranges things in the actual world in such a 
way that (2) is false; so it is God who brings it about that (2) is false. Or consider 
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(5) God promised Abraham that he would be the father of many nations, 
and then God broke that promise. 
If (5) is necessarily false, as I think it is, there are nonetheless several different 
ways in which God might have brought about its falsity. He might simply never 
have created Abraham in the first place; or he might never have made a promise 
to Abraham; or he might have created Abraham and made a promise to him, as 
most Jews and Christians believe, and then have affected history in such a way 
that the promise was kept. And there are, of course, many different ways in 
which God might have so affected history that the promise was kept. 
It seems clear, therefore, that one. can distinguish, at least roughly, between 
two kinds of necessary truths and two kinds of necessary falsehoods. With respect 
to some necessarily true propositions, such as (4), no one, not even God, brings 
it about that these propositions are true; but with respect to others, such as (1), 
God does bring it about that they are true. Similarly, with respect to some 
necessarily false propositions, such as (3), no one brings it about that these 
propositions are false; but with respect to others, such as (2) or (5), God does 
bring it about that they are false. So if God is a necessary being who possesses 
certain essential properties, then there is a special class of non-contingent prop-
ositions. These propositions, though true in all possible worlds or false in all 
possible worlds, are nonetheless similar to contingent propositions in this respect: 
their truth or falsity depends, in a sense that will have to be specified, upon how 
God chooses to act in the world. 
ii 
Because God actually brings it about that 
(1) There exists a favorable balance of good over evil 
is true and that 
(2) At the year 2000 every creature will begin an eternity of endless 
torment. 
is false, it is plausible to conclude, I think, that God also has the power to bring 
it about that (1) is false and (2) is true. It does not in general follow, to be sure, 
that a person with the power to bring it about that a proposition p is true also 
has the power to bring it about that p is false. Even if at T 1 Smith has the power 
to fling a rock through a particular window and thus bring it about that 
(6) The window is broken at T2 
is true, he may not have the power to bring it about that (6) is false; he may not 
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have this power because some other person, or perhaps even an earthquake, may 
have shattered the window in the event that Smith had not. In the case of a 
proposition such as 0), however, God has the power to bring it about that (1) 
is true, I believe, only if he also has the power to bring it about that (1) is false; 
and in the case of a proposition such as (2), God has the power to bring it about 
that (2) is false only if he also has the power to bring it about that (2) is true. 
For consider this principle: 
(P I) It is possible that someone has the power to bring it about that a 
proposition p is true if, and only if, it is possible that someone 
has the power to bring it about that p is false. 
If this principle is true, as I think it is, then God seemingly does have the power 
to bring it about that (1) is false and (2) is true; and he has this power even 
though (1) is necessarily true and (2) is necessarily false. This can perhaps be 
shown as follows. If God does bring it about that (1) is true, then he of course 
has the power to bring it about that (I) is true; if he has the power to bring it 
about that (1) is true, then it is possible that someone has the power to bring it 
about that (1) is true; and if it is possible that someone has the power to bring 
it about that (1) is true, then (according to (PI) it is also possible that someone 
has the power to bring it about that (1) is false. So God brings it about that (1) 
is true only if it is possible that someone has the power to bring it about that 
(1) is false. But of course it is possible that someone has the power to bring it 
about that (1) is false only if there is a possible world in which someone has 
that power, and no one other than God, it would seem, is even a plausible 
candidate at this point. If God exists and is omnipotent in every world, then in 
every world it is God who determines the overall balance of good and evil. 
Since, moreover, God is also morally perfect in every world in which he exists, 
there must be some world in which God has the power to do something-such 
as bring it about that (1) is false-which his essential properties entail he will 
never exercise. And if there is some world in which God has that power, we 
may safely conclude, I think, that the actual world is one of them; we may safely 
conclude this because, though some of God's powers do vary from world to 
world (particularly those he has in worlds containing free agents), there seems 
to be no reason why this power would be one of them. If (PI) is true, therefore, 
God does have powers which his essential properties entail he will never exercise. 4 
But is (PI) in fact true? It certainly seems to hold for such non-contingent 
propositions as (3) and (4) above; it is impossible, for instance, that someone 
has the power to bring it about that 
(4) 2 + 2 = 4 
is false, and it is likewise impossible, therefore, that someone has the power to 
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bring it about that this proposition is true. (P J) also seems to hold for contingent 
propositions. It could hardly be possible that someone has the power to bring it 
about that a contingent proposition p is true unless it were also possible that 
someone has the power to bring it about that p is false; and if it is impossible 
that someone should now have the power to bring it about that 
(7) Columbus sailed for America in 1492 
is false, as many would insist, it is also impossible that someone should now 
have the power to bring it about that (7) is true. As one might expect, however, 
the controversial cases are such propositions as 0), (2), and (5) above-propo-
sitions which, though non-contingent (given certain assumptions), share some 
of the properties of contingent propositions. Not only does God bring it about 
that the universe contains a favorable balance of good over evil and hence bring 
it about that (1) is true: it seems that any specific act he performs in his effort 
to bring this about is one he has the power not to perform. And there is, no 
doubt, a coIlection of specific acts within God's power to perform which, if 
taken as a collection, would result in an unfavorable balance of evil over good 
in the universe. If, indeed, God has the power to cause every creature to experience 
a fleeting instant of suffering, or perhaps two or three such fleeting instants, 
why should he not also have the power (if not the will) to keep it up for an 
eternity? Why should he not also have the power to bring it about that (2) is true? 
Of course it may be within God's power to perform an action A and also 
within his power to perform an action B, but not within his power to do both A 
and B; similarly, it may be within God's power to cause a person S to experience 
pain during any given instant of S's life, but not within his power to cause S to 
experience pain continuously throughout every instant of S's life. Two or more 
actions that are individually possible may not be jointly compossible. But still, 
some explanation must be given for this fact: it is God who brings it about 
that-who is actuaIly responsible for the fact that-(l) is true and (2) is false. 
It is God who is responsible for this even though (1) is necessarily true and (2) 
is necessarily false. Now how are we to explain this fact? Since there are no 
worlds in which (1) is false, how are we to explain the fact that the truth of (1) 
actually depends upon actions of God?-and since there are no worlds in which 
(2) is true, how are we to explain the fact that the falsity of (2) actuaIly depends 
upon actions of God. I propose to explain it this way. Though it is, in the fuIlest 
sense, within God's power to bring it about that (I) is false and (2) is true, he 
has chosen not to exercise that power. He has chosen rather to bring it about 
that (1) is true and (2) is false. There is, to be sure, no possible world in which 
God exercises his power to bring it about that (1) is false, nor is there any in 
which he exercises his power to bring it about that (2) is true. But that implies 
no limitation whatsoever upon his power to act. Here we must distinguish carefully 
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between the "could" of power and the "could" of logical possibil ity. God could 
bring it about that (1) is false in this sense: he has the power to do so. But the 
proposition, God brings it about that (1) is false, could not itself be true for this 
reason: it is simply not possible that God, a perfectly loving being, would exercise 
his power to make it true. In other words, whether God has the power to do 
something is one question; whether it is possible that he would ever want to 
exercise that power is another. That God has the power to do something does 
not entail even the possibility that he would ever want to exercise that power. 
But how could God have the power to do something, one might ask, if it is 
impossible for him to exercise that power'? The answer is that it is quite possible 
for God to exercise the relevant power in this sense: he has the power to exercise 
his power to do it. If God has the power to do something, then he has the power 
to exercise his power to do it. It is just that, with respect to some of his powers, 
he does not want to exercise them; it is not even possible that he would want 
to exercise them, so it is not even possible that he will exercise them. But he 
could exercise these powers if he wanted to; and since, moreover. his refusal to 
exercise these powers is in no way determined by antecedent causal conditions 
outside his control, he is, in the fullest sense, free to exercise them. He is, in 
the fullest sense, free to exercise his power to bring about certain impossible 
states of affairs. 
iii 
According to some libertarians (though perhaps not all), it is within the power 
of a person S to perform an action A at a time T only if at T it is causally 
possible for S to do A; and here it is tempting, perhaps, to regard that which is 
causally possible as a sub-class of that which is logically possible. If one accepts 
a basically libertarian conception of free agency, therefore, one might conclude 
that God himself has the power to do A at T only if it is logically possible that 
he should exercise that power. But this inference is, I now believe, a mistake. 
We must ask, first of all, what it means to say that an event is causally 
possible. What libertarians want to deny is simply that our free actions are 
causally determined, and their point is essentially this negative one: If it is 
causally determined that I will perform an action A, then it is causally impossible 
for me to refrain from A; and if it is causally impossible for me to refrain from 
A, then I am in fact powerless to refrain from A. But my doing A is a free act 
only if it is both within my power to do A and within my power to refrain from 
A; so if my doing A is causally determined, it is not a free act. Now consider 
the following definitions: 
(D]) An event E is causally impossible at a time T if, and only if, 
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there exist at T conditions that are causally sufficient for the 
non-occurrence of E. 
(D2) An event E is causally possible at a time T if, and only if, E is 
not causally impossible at T. 
Though perhaps not adequate for all purposes, these definitions are, it seems, 
fully adequate for the purpose of making the libertarian's rather negative point 
about determinism. But given these definitions, one cannot regard that which is 
causally possible as simply a sub-class of that which is logically possible. For 
consider an action A, perhaps a very malicious act, that God never performs in 
any possible world. Even if God does A in no world whatsoever and his doing 
A is therefore logically impossible, his doing A remains causally possible in the 
sense specified by (D2); nothing God does, after all, not even that which flows 
from the necessity of his own nature, is causally determined, and there are no 
causal conditions that prevent him from doing anything he chooses not to do. 
God himself, being the First Cause, may cause the heavens and the earth to 
exist, but nothing causes him to cause the heavens and the earth to exist. Even 
if it should turn out to be a necessary truth that God creates a physical universe 
of some kind or another-and I suspect it is-nothing causes him to create a 
universe of any kind. Certainly God's will can be thought of as an expression 
of his own character and nature-indeed his character traits can perhaps be 
thought of as simply descriptions of how he wills-but the one who creates 
every causal law is not himself causally determined in any of his actions. He 
is, in fact, the freest of all free agents. 
A theist, therefore, who accepts my thesis that God has power that his essential 
properties entail he will never exercise can still be a libertarian in the matter of 
free agency; and furthermore, a Christian theist who rejects that thesis must 
confront some very awkward theological consequences. For consider, first of 
all, the second person of the Trinity, the eternally begotten Son of God who, 
according to Christian theology, was incarnated in the flesh. One who insists 
that an agent has the power to do something only if there is a possible world in 
which he does it, must confront this consequence: either there is a possible world 
in which the Son succumbs to temptation and sins or the Son is not free to sin 
and is not, therefore, a free moral agent. But if the Son does succumb to 
temptation and sin in some possible world, it is hard to make sense of the claim 
that he is not only human but also divine; and if he is not a free moral agent, 
it is hard to make sense of the claim that he is not only divine but also human. 
In the latter case, it is also hard to make sense of the claim that "in every respect 
[he] has been tempted as we are, yet without sinning" (Hebrews 4:15). Now 
one might feel as if the doctrine of the incarnation already presents so many 
logical perplexities that one more is of little concern, but a Christian theologian 
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can avoid a blatant contradiction at this point simply by accepting the thesis of 
this paper-simply by denying that God's power to do something implies the 
logical possibility that he will exercise that power. 
Or consider, secondly, the biblical account of the flood, and assume, just for 
purposes of illustration, that this account is historically accurate. Assume, in 
other words, that God once destroyed the entire population of the earth, except 
for Noah, his family, and the others in the ark; and assume further that God 
then promised never again so to destroy the earth, sealing his promise with a 
rainbow. If God is necessarily true to his word-if, that is, there is no possible 
world in which he breaks a promise-4ioes it follow that he is now powerless 
to destroy the earth by means of a flood? That would certainly seem to follow 
if God not only never breaks a promise but is powerless to do so. Given that 
God has already promised never again so to destroy the earth (and given that it 
is now too late for anyone, even God, to obviate that promise),' God now has 
the power to destroy the earth only if he now has the power to break a promise. 
But if every divine power must be exercised in some possible world, then God 
is indeed powerless to break a promise and therefore powerless, at this time, to 
destroy the earth by means of a flood. And is that not a paradoxical consequence? 
I, at least, would prefer to say that God still has the power to destroy the earth 
by means of a flood but just does not want to; it is no longer even possible that 
he would want to exercise that power. 
Or consider, finally, this example. An account could be given, presumably, 
of what it means for God to speak to a person and to communicate propositions 
in the course of a conversation. Now suppose that Smith is home at a time T I, 
and then leaves his home at a later time T 2; that during this entire period of time 
God is speaking to me through a burning cornstalk in my vegetable garden; and 
that one of his purposes in communicating with me is to inform me of Smith's 
whereabouts: at T I he informs me that Smith is home and at T 2 he informs me 
that Smith has left his home. If God is essentially truthful and therefore cannot 
lie, does it follow that God has the power at T 1 to communicate to me the tensed 
proposition, Smith is now at home, but lacks that power at T2? Again, it seems 
to me altogether paradoxical to draw any such implication. It seems to me that 
in any sense in which God has the power to communicate a true proposition, he 
also has the power to communicate a false proposition; it is just logically impos-
sible that he would ever want to exercise his power to communicate a false 
proposition. 
It will no doubt be objected at this point that I have simply confused two 
senses of the term "power," or at least that I have confused the power to do 
something with the ability and know-how to do it. God certainly has the ability, 
one might argue, to produce another devastating flood, and he certainly knows 
how to communicate a proposition that happens to be false; but given his essential 
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properties, there is a more fundamental sense in which he is powerless to make 
use of that ability. An agent may, after all, have the ability to do something and 
still lack the power to make use of that ability. A concert violinist, stranded on 
a deserted island, may retain (for awhile anyway) her ability to play the violin; 
but in the absence of any violin on the island (and the materials to make one), 
there is a more fundamental sense in which she is powerless to make use of that 
ability. 
The objection, however, seems to me unconvincing and the analogy inapprop-
riate for two reasons. In the first place, the concert violinist (in the situation just 
described) could not playa violin even if she wanted to, and that is, to be sure, 
one kind of situation in which a person can be said to have the ability to do 
something but not the power to make use of that ability. But that is hardly 
analogous to what I have said about God-who no doubt could, if he wanted 
to, lie more effectively than any other person that exists. Now the libertarian 
will of course deny--quite rightly, I believe-that a person S has the power to 
do A if and only if S would do A on the condition that S should choose to do 
A. On this score, it seems to me, the libertarian is right and the compatibilist 
wrong. If S's refraining from A is causally determined by factors outside of S's 
control, then even if S would do A on the condition that S should choose to do 
A, S remains, I think, powerless to do A. But this brings me to a second (and 
more important) consideration. In the case of created persons, such as ourselves, 
who are subject to causal laws, one can sensibly speak of acquired skills and 
abilities and one can easily imagine a situation in which we are powerless to 
employ some of our skills and abilities. In our own case, one can sensibly ask, 
moreover, whether our will has been shaped by, and is therefore dependent 
upon, causal conditions external to ourselves and over which we have no control; 
one can sensibly ask whether even our will is something we are responsible for. 
In the case of God, however, things stand quite differently. In his providential 
control of history, God does, perhaps, face obstacles of a certain kind; namely 
the free choices, particularly the evil choices, of created persons. However much 
God may prefer that I make the right choice in a particular 'situation, he may be 
powerless to bring it about that I make the right (free) choice in that situation. 
But since God has no acquired skills and abilities and is subject to no causal 
laws, since none of his actions is causally determined at all and therefore none 
of them is determined by causal conditions beyond his control, it is necessarily 
true, I think, that God's will is always free and that he is always responsible for 
it. Certainly the perfection of his own nature could hardly be a limitation of his 
power. In the case of God, therefore, we can say that he has the power to do 
A if, and only if, he would do A on the condition that he should choose to do 
A. We can say this for the following reason: So long as a person's will is not 
itself under the control of another and not itself shaped by causal conditions 
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beyond his control, he has the power to do anything he would do on the condition 
that he should choose to do it. 
There is, incidentally, a related issue concerning the moral freedom of perfected 
saints. According to Augustine, the time will come when the company of the 
redeemed in heaven will never again disobey God, never again even be tempted 
to disobey God; and this will by no means be a happy accident. The redeemed 
will, after all, have had their hearts transformed and their minds renewed. They 
will be in possession of the beatific vision, and they will see clearly both that 
God is the source of their happiness and that disobedience can produce only 
greater and greater misery in their lives. It will no longer be possible, therefore-
no longer psychologically possible, one might say, though that notion is by no 
means clear-it will no longer be possible for the redeemed to disobey God. 
But why should such clear vision and moral perfection detract from their moral 
freedom? Will not the redeemed in heaven retain the power (though not the will) 
to disobey God? The view that one would lose one's moral freedom at the very 
moment one becomes wise enough to see that evil is always destructive, always 
contrary to one's own interest as well as the interest of others-at the very 
moment that, having been purged of all self-deception and all evil inclinations, 
one no longer has any evil motives left-would be a remarkable view of moral 
freedom indeed. What is needed at this point, I think, is a conception of freedom 
and power that enables us to make three things clear simultaneously: (1) why, 
in the case of God, his moral perfection in no way limits his power to act; (2) 
why, in the case of created persons, freedom and determinism are logically 
incompatible; and (3) why, in the case of perfected saints, their acquired perfec-
tion in no way limits their power to act either. It is to this conception of freedom 
that I shall tum in the following section. 
iv 
The conception of freedom and power we are looking for is, I think, something 
like the following. First of all, I am free with respect to an action A only if it 
is both within my power to do A and within my power to refrain from A; that 
point may not take us very far, but it at least has the virtue of being relatively 
non-controversial. Beyond that, I am prepared to concede this much to the 
libertarian. I do something freely only if, in some vague sense, the action in 
question is truly mine; and the action is truly mine only if, in some reasonably 
clear sense, it is not imposed upon me from outside, only if it is not causally 
determined by conditions external to myself and beyond my control. But under 
what conditions do I have the power to do something that I do not in fact choose 
to do? Perhaps no analysis will be fully adequate at this point, but the following 
should at least enable one to claim that divine freedom and the kind of freedom 
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required by the Free Will Defense are in fact the same kind of freedom: 
(P2) It is within the power of a person S to perform an action A that 
S does not, in fact, perform only if (a) S would do A on the 
condition that S should choose to do A and (b) no conditions 
external to S and beyond S' s control are causally sufficient for 
S's not choosing to do A. 
Because condition (b) of this principle could never be met for any created person 
in a fully deterministic universe, the principle clearly requires a basically liber-
tarian conception of human freedom; it requires us to say that no person whose 
actions are ultimately determined by God, not even one whose actions are an 
expression of his or her created nature, is truly free. In the case of created 
persons, it seems, the problem is precisely that their nature is a created nature; 
it must be produced, or developed, or cultivated in one way or another.6 So if 
the nature (or character) of a created person were to be shaped entirely by God, 
or entirely by causal conditions beyond that person's control, then such a person 
would have no independence or autonomy at all; such a person would be a mere 
extension of God, or the universe, or whatever. If God wanted to create indepen-
dent beings, therefore-what I would regard as true persons with significant 
moral freedom-he had no choice, I am convinced, but to create beings who 
are free in the libertarian sense. And a virtue of (P2) is that it enables us to 
safeguard just such intuitions as these. 
But (P2) is also consistent with my thesis in this paper concerning the freedom 
of God. Suppose, first of all, that Spinoza were right and there were but one 
possible world that God actualizes in accordance with his moral perfection; 
suppose, in other words, that "In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things 
are determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in a certain 
manner."7 According to my thesis in this paper, it would still follow that exactly 
one free agent exists, namely God, as Spinoza himself insisted and as was 
reflected in his own definitions for "freedom" and "compulsion": 
That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its own 
nature alone and is determined to action by itself alone. That thing, on 
the other hand, is called necessary or rather compelled which by another 
is determined to existence and action in a fixed and prescribed manner. 8 
Like Spinoza, C. S. Lewis also argues, both elegantly and persuasively, that 
divine freedom does not require logical contingency: 
Whatever human freedom means, Divine freedom cannot mean indeter-
minacy between alternatives and choice of one of them. Perfect goodness 
can never debate about the end to be obtained, and perfect wisdom 
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cannot debate about the means most suited to achieve it. The freedom 
of God consists in the fact that no cause other than Himself produces 
His acts and no external obstacle impedes them-that His own goodness 
is the root from which they all grow and His own omnipotence the air 
in which they all flower. 9 
15 
With respect to divine freedom, then, Lewis agrees with Spinoza; and Spinoza's 
view is, I believe, essentially correct. An action is free, we have conceded, only 
when it "belongs" to the agent alone, only when it is performed by an agent 
whose actions are not determined by any event or set of events external to the 
agent. Such an action will typically involve two things, among others: at least 
one event that is caused by the agent alone, and at least one uncaused event. If, 
for example, I should freely move my arm for the purpose of illustrating a 
philosophical point, the motion of my arm would no doubt be caused by me, 
the agent, but the event consisting of my causing my arm to move would not 
itself be caused by anything at all and certainly not by some other event in the 
world. As already suggested, however, all of God's actions, even those that 
express the necessity of his own nature meet these conditions and should, I have 
argued, be regarded as truly free. And if they are truly free, then God has the 
power, if not the will, to refrain from them. 
But if Spinoza' s conception of divine freedom is essentially correct, his denial 
of all contingency in the world is altogether dubious, I think, and, at the very 
least, inconsistent with Christian theology. Accordingly, let us alter our assump-
tions in the following way. Let us continue to assume that in this sense there is 
no contingency in the being of God: with respect to any contingent state of 
affairs and its complement, God is determined by essential elements in his nature 
to actualize (in Plantinga's weak sense lO) whichever one is included in the best 
world he is able to actualize. Let us continue to assume, in other words, that 
God necessarily actualizes the best world he can and that exactly one world, 
call it a, qualifies as that world. If a also includes persons who are free in the 
libertarian sense, then it remains a contingent fact that a is a world within God's 
power to actualize; and if this is a contingent fact, then room still remains, it 
seems, for an infinite number of different possible worlds. For suppose, to 
simplify matters, that in a situation S Smith is free with respect to an action A 
and that the following SUbjunctive conditionals are both necessarily true: 
(8) If Smith should freely do A in S, then God would respond in 
manner M. 
(9) If Smith should freely refrain from A in S, then God would respond 
in manner N. 
If we suppose further that the antecedent of (8) is in fact true (that Smith freely 
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chooses to do A in S), it will follow that God's responding in manner M is an 
expression of essential elements in his nature. Of course we need not suppose 
that (8) and (9) are necessarily true in order to get that result. If God's responding 
in manner M were determined not only by how Smith chooses to act, but also 
by how other free persons choose to act in a variety of other situations as well, 
God's responding in manner M might express essential elements in his nature 
even on the assumption that (8) and (9) are contingently true. To simplify matters, 
however, let us suppose that (8) and (9) are indeed necessarily true. Even so, 
it remains a contingent fact that Smith freely does A in S and therefore a 
contingent fact that God acts in manner M; God's action is contingent, one might 
say, only because Smith's action is contingent, but God's action remains contin-
gent nonetheless. There is another possible world in which Smith refrains from 
A in S and hence God does not act in manner M. Accordingly, even if God 
exists necessarily and necessarily creates the best world he can~ven if there 
is exactly one such world-there remains, contrary to what Spinoza thought, 
more than enough room for contingency in the world. 11 
It seems, then, that one can accept Spinoza's conception of divine freedom 
without rejecting all contingency in the world. Nonetheless, Spinoza's conception 
requires at least one qualification, because some of God's choices may be rela-
tively trivial; if God creates a world that contains 12,141,954 iguanas at a time 
T, it seems unlikely, as Tom Flint points out, that "dire moral consequences 
would have resulted had God brought it about that 12,141,955 exisited at that 
time ... "12 It seems unlikely, in other words, that exactly one world is the very 
best world God could create; perhaps there is a set of equally good worlds from 
which God is free to choose. But if one tries to exploit this qualification in an 
effort to safeguard divine freedom, if one restricts God's freedom to very trivial 
choices, one ends up, as Wesley Morriston points out, denying that God is "free 
when anything morally significant is at stake."'3 And quite apart from the issue 
of moral significance, there is this consequence: the more important God's choice 
is, the less free it is; the less important it is, the more free it is. To restrict God's 
freedom to trivial choices and to deny that he has any moral freedom at all is 
hardly, it seems to me, a satisfactory view of divine freedom. 
A far better strategy, I think, is first to concede that Spinoza's conception of 
divine freedom is essentially correct, and then to exploit the distinction between 
created and uncreated persons in an effort to explain why, in the case of created 
persons, free will and determinism are incompatible. Consider this fundamental 
assumption of the Free Will Defense: that God has a morally sufficient reason 
to create a universe in which the highest moral virtues can be cultivated. According 
to libertarians, moral virtues cannot be imposed upon one person by another and 
cannot be instilled, produced, or brought about by a sufficient cause external to 
the agent. The point is once again essentially negative: any disposition to behave 
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that is produced by an act of creation (i.e., by a sufficient cause external to the 
created agent), whatever else it may be, is not a moral virtue. Some dispositions, 
no doubt, are produced in this way, for example the baby's disposition to cry 
when hungry, but a moral virtue cannot be produced in this way. That point, 
however, has no relevance in the case of God, since none of God's dispositions 
to behave are imposed upon him by an act of creation; when God acts in a loving 
way, for instance, that is a true expression of himself as an independent being. 
It is only in the case of created persons, therefore, that the problem of determinism 
is even relevant. If God wanted to create persons who are, like himself, both 
independent and morally virtuous-who are at least sometimes the uncaused 
cause of morally right actions-he had no choice but to create persons who are 
free in the libertarian sense. Then, once these created persons are subjected to 
a process of "soul-making," as John Hick calls it, once they are perfected through 
a complex process of free choice, failure, correction, and redemption, their 
perfected nature need not be thought of as something imposed upon them from 
without. So long as their own free and uncaused choices play some role in their 
own perfection-even if it be nothing more than a simple letting go, a willingness 
to allow the Spirit of God to do its work-their perfected nature can be thought 
of as truly their own. 
We here touch upon a point that the New Testament presents as a great mystery: 
the creation of a child of God. According to the New Testament, created persons 
come into their full inheritance only when they come to participate fully in the 
divine nature, only when it becomes no more possible for them to will evil than 
it is for God himself. To penetrate this mystery fully, I suppose, we should have 
to understand how Jesus could say, "I and my father are one," or how Paul 
could say, "It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me." But this 
much, it seems to me, is clear: a Christian view of moral perfection requires 
that we distinguish between a correct and an incorrect claim that libertarians 
have made. The correct claim is this: No action that can be traced back to a 
sufficient cause external to the agent is truly free. The incorrect claim is this: 
An action is free only if it is logically and psychologically possible for the person 
who performs it to refrain from it. The latter claim seems to me inconsistent not 
only with Christian theology, but with widespread intuitions about the nature of 
moral character as well. In a very real sense, the measure of one's moral 
character-the measure of one's love, for instance-is just the extent to which 
certain actions are no longer possible. The man who truly loves his wife of thirty 
years does not simply refrain from subjecting her to severe torture on a given 
occasion; it is not even possible that he should want to do such a thing. It would 
be utterly inconsistent with the love that controls him. The trick, of course, is 
to spell out clearly the nature of the impossibility here, which is, it seems to 
me, something like this. The disposition to love, like other moral virtues, is 
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essentially a form of true vision or enlightenment, a way of seeing things as 
God sees them; it is no more possible for the man who loves his wife to want 
to torture her than it is for him to believe that she does not exist. In both cases, 
the man simply sees the truth of the matter; in the former, he sees (correctly) 
that his own interests and those of his wife do not conflict, that he could not 
even try to harm his wife without in fact harming himself. But the important 
point, I repeat, is that such impossibilities are an essential part of moral virtue 
and in no way detract from one's moral responsibility. Just as the greatest 
conceivable being is one who (logically) could not choose to act in ways that 
are malicious and cruel, so the perfected saint is one who (psychologically) could 
not choose to act in such ways either. And just as the greatest conceivable being 
nonetheless has the power, I have argued, to act in such ways, so also, I think, 
does the perfected saint. So here, too, we must distinguish between the "could" 
of power and the "could" of psychological possibility. One might have the power 
to do something, even though it is psychologically impossible that one should 
want to exercise that power. 
But none of this counts against the other claim that libertarians have made: 
that no free action can be traced back to a sufficient cause external to the agent. 
Just as God remains the uncaused cause of events in the world even in those 
cases where his actions are determined by his own nature (or character), so also 
do the perfected saints. Perfected saints do differ from God in this respect: their 
moral character is an acquired character and must therefore befreely appropriated. 
Their moral character is no more something distinct from themselves as agents, 
however, than God's character is something distinct from himself; it simply 
defines who they are, what kind of person they have become (loving, just, etc.). 
According to the Christian religion, of course, the process of moral development 
is exceedingly complex. Though the moral virtues can no doubt be cultivated 
in a variety of subtle ways, the result is more often than not failure. That is why 
the New Testament speaks of the need for a transformed heart and insists that 
we are saved by grace, not by human effort. The point is not that God is able 
to impose the moral virtues upon us from outside; the point is that moral growth 
requires an act of submission, the willingness to permit a higher power to work 
in and through us in order that we might be truly enlightened. It is this essential 
condition of moral perfection-the act of submission, the letting go--that cannot, 
in my opinion, be explained in terms of "event-causation"; but whatever my 
personal beliefs in the matter, anyone who acknowledges that uncaused choices 
play an essential part in the moral development of created persons will thereby 
give point to the Free Will Defense. It is the distinction between created and 
uncreated persons that is important in this context; and as (P2) demonstrates, 
this distinction will enable one to combine Spinoza's conception of divine freedom 
with a basically libertarian conception of human freedom. 
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In this paper, I have argued that both God and the perfected saints remain 
free with respect to actions that are determined by their own character and nature; 
I have also argued that this claim is compatible with the Free Will Defense as 
a solution to the problem of evil. In the preceding section, moreover, I suggested 
that a Christian view of moral perfection requires us to distinguish between a 
correct and an incorrect claim that libertarians have made, and I tried there to 
sketch out, without much attention to detail, a picture of free agency that combines 
Spinoza's conception of divine freedom with a basically libertarian conception 
of human freedom. That there are difficulties with the picture I have sketched, 
I freely acknowledge; that these difficulties cannot be met, I am not yet prepared 
to concede. In this final section, therefore, I shall address a couple of technical 
difficulties with the picture I have sketched. 
The place to begin, I suppose, is with an intuition that underlies some of the 
most powerful arguments against compatibilism: the intuition that, if T am pow-
erless to prevent something from happening, then I am also powerless to prevent 
the inevitable consequences of its happening. Reminiscent of a familiar modal 
principle-the principle that if p is necessarily true and p entails q, then q is 
necessarily true-the intuition might be expressed initially as follows: 
(P3) If P entails q, p is true, and it is not within S's power to bring it 
about that p is false, then it is not within S's power to bring it 
about that q is false either. 
On the face of it, this principle seems unexceptionable and seems to provide a 
powerful argument against the theory that free agency and causal determinism 
are logically compatible. For suppose that the thesis of determinism-the thesis 
that every event has a sufficient cause-were true. It would then follow that 
every action I perform is an inevitable consequence of conditions that are both 
external to myself and beyond my control. According to our ordinary ways of 
thinking, for instance, conditions that existed in 1500 A.D. are both external to 
myself and beyond my control; but if determinism were true, then any action I 
perform today would be an inevitable consequence of conditions that existed in 
1500 A.D. Even if some form of backwards causation were possible, moreover-
and I am by no means convinced it is not-the remote causes of my present 
actions could not possibly be under my control now. If only some actions of 
mine--call them D-actions--can be traced back to such remote causes, it might 
still be possible, perhaps, that the remote causes of these D-actions are still under 
my control now; for it might still be possible that it is now within my (unexercised) 
power to perform some other action (some non-D-action) such that, were I to 
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perfonn it, the remote causes of some D-action would not have existed. But if 
every action of mine can be traced back to such remote causes, then for any 
action A that I perfonn, there will be some condition (or set of conditions) over 
which I have no control that is causally sufficient for A. Now let q be a true 
proposition of the form: Talbott will do A tomorrow. If detenninism is true, 
there will be some other proposition p that satisfies the antecedent of (P3): p will 
entail q, p will be true, and it will not be within my power to bring it about that 
p is false. If we adopt the common sense assumption that causal conditions 
existing in 1500 A.D. are now beyond my control, p might be a conjunctive 
proposition that describes both the state of the universe in 1500 A.D. and certain 
laws of nature. But then, if it is not within my power to bring it about that p is 
false and p entails q, it follows (according to (P3) that it is not within my power 
to bring it about that q is false either. If, furthennore, it is not within my power 
to bring it about the q is false, then it is not within my power to refrain from 
A; and if it is not within my power to refrain from A, then I am not free with 
respect to A. If detenninism is true, therefore, I am not a free agent. 
Now I find this argument altogether convincing and must therefore confront 
a difficulty. As it stands, (P3) is not only inconsistent with compatibilism: it is 
inconsistent with my main thesis in this paper as well. I have argued that one 
must distinguish between two classes of necessarily true propositions: those 
whose truth in the actual world is not brought about by any agent at all, not 
even by God, and those whose truth is indeed brought about by God. For lack 
of better tenninology, we might call the fonner "independent necessary truths" 
and the latter "dependent necessary truths." With respect to the latter, I have 
also argued that God has the (unexercised) power to bring it about that these 
propositions are false; and that argument is clearly inconsistent with (P3). For 
consider once again 
(4) 2 + 2 = 4 
and 
(1) There exists a favorable balance of good over evil. 
If aU necessarily true propositions are logically equivalent and (1) is indeed 
necessarily true, then (4) entails (1); so if God is powerless to bring it about that 
(4) is false, as I am assuming, it would follow, given (P3), that he is also 
powerless to bring it about that (1) is false. Or consider: 
(10) God exists 
and 
(11) God is loving and kind. 
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One might be inclined to argue that (10) and (11) are not only necessarily true, 
but independent necessary truths; and if they are, then God is powerless to bring 
it about that these propositions are false. But (10) and (11) each entails that God 
never performs any action that is malicious and cruel; so it follows, given (P3)' 
that God is powerless to perform any such action. If (P3) is acceptable as it 
stands, therefore, then the main thesis of this paper is false. 
But (P3) should, it seems to me, be restricted in some way. (P3) certainly 
seems to hold in the case of contingent propositions; if I am now powerless to 
bring it about that 
(12) Lincoln was assassinated in 1865 
is false, then I am also powerless to bring it about that a logical consequence 
of (12), namely 
(13) Lincoln was alive in 1865, 
is false. Nor can there be any question about cases where p and q are both 
independent necessary truths, or even where they are both dependent necessary 
truths. In the case where p is an independent and q a dependent necessary truth, 
however, there are, I believe, good reasons for denying that (P3) is a sound 
principle; indeed anyone who grants a distinction between these two kinds of 
necessary truth must be prepared, I think, to modify some plausible sounding 
principles. Consider this example. If p and q are logically equivalent and God 
has the power to bring it about that p is true, then he also has the power, one 
might think, to bring it about that q is true. But that could not possibly be right 
if there really are the two kinds of necessary truth. (1) and (4) are, after all, 
logically equivalent, but God's power to bring it about that (J) is true, to produce 
a favorable balance of good over evil in the world, in no way implies the power 
to bring it about that (4) is true. No one brings it about that two plus two equals 
four. And similarly for (P3). The question of whether God has the power to 
bring it about that (1) is false is independent of whether he has the power to 
bring it about that (4) is false; the two questions are independent for the same 
reason that whether God brings it about that (J) is true is independent of whether 
he brings it about that (4) is true. Similarly, if 
(10) God exists 
and 
(1 ] ) God is loving and kind 
are treated as independent necessary truths, they are no different from 
(4) 2 + 2 = 4 
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in this regard; God's powers with respect to independent necessary truths are 
logically independent of his powers with respect to dependent necessary truths. 
Accordingly, even though (II) entails that God never does anything malicious 
and cruel, God may nonetheless have the (unexercised) power to perform such 
acts; and if that sounds paradoxical, the reason may be that one is inclined to 
ask an improper question at this point, something like: "What if God should 
actually do something malicious and cruel? Would he not then be malicious and 
cruel himself?" But that question is improper, given the nature of my thesis. I 
have argued that even though it is logically impossible that God should exercise 
his power to do something malicious and cruel, he nonetheless has such power. 
The assumption that God does exercise such power is therefore necessarily false 
and thus entails every proposition; it even entails that God is loving and kind! 
The important point, however, is the one already made: if (10) and (11) are 
treated as independent necessary truths, then they have no relevance whatsoever 
to God's powers with respect to dependent necessary truths. 
Of course one might adopt, at this point, a view that I find attractive: the view 
that even though (11) is necessarily true, it is nonetheless God's freely chosen 
nature to be loving and kind. One might adopt, in other words, the view that 
(11) is a dependent necessary truth. If so, then God does have the (unexercised) 
power to bring it about that (11) is false. He has the power to perform malicious 
and cruel acts and therefore has the power to do something such that, were he 
to do it, he would not be loving and kind at all but malicious and cruel instead. 
He has this power even though it is logically impossible that he should want to 
exercise it. And similarly for the perfected saints. Despite their transformed 
hearts and renewed minds, the perfected saints retain the power (but not the 
will) to sin. They will always have the power to do something such that, were 
they to do it, they would not be perfected saints at all but dishonest and unfaithful 
sinners instead; they will always have such power even when it becomes 
psychologically impossible that they should want to exercise it. In a word, to 
have the power to sin is one thing; to be the kind of person who might want to 
exercise such power is quite another. \4 
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3. One might object at this point that, even though God performs actions in the world that determine 
how (1) is true, he does not thereby bring it about that (1) is true. But one who raises such an 
objection owes us some explanation of what this could possibly mean. Suppose that a man, Smith, 
draws a triangle on a blank page at a time T and thus brings it about that 
(Al A plane figure is on the page at T 
is true. Because Smith could have rendered (Al true by drawing a square or a rectangle on the page, 
he has presumably determined how (Al is true, that is, how it comes to be that (A) is true. But 
Smith could hardly have determined how it comes to be that (A) is true without, at the same time, 
bringing it about that (Al is true. Of course there are many differences between (I) and (A), not 
the least of which is that (I), unlike (A), is necessarily true. But though (1) is indeed necessarily 
true, there is no world in which something other than God's decisions determine how (I) is true. 
And that point seems to me decisive. If (i) a proposition p were true in all possible worlds, and (ii) 
in some of these worlds God's decisions were not responsible for how p is true, but (iii) in the actual 
world God's decisions were responsible for how p is true, then one might be tempted to say something 
like this: "That p is true is independent of what decisions God makes in the actual world concerning 
how p is true," or "Like 2 + 2 = 4 P would have been true regardless of what decisions God had 
made; so even if in the actual world God determines how p is true, he does not bring it about that 
p is true." In the case of ( I ), moreover, God is prepared (given our assumptions about his nature) 
to do whatever is necessary to guarantee that (1) is true; that these requirements are different in 
different possible worlds hardly entitles us to deny that it is God who guarantees, who actually 
brings it about, that (1) is true. (See also note 4.) 
4. The argument of this paragraph is intended to counter the following kind of view. One might 
hold that God has the power to bring it about that (1) is true only in this sense: "he has the power 
to bring about the contingent arrangements of things which constitute the truth conditions of (1) in 
the actual world." Where C is the proposition that specifies these contingent arrangements, God 
brings it about that (I) is true, in other words, only in the sense that he brings it about that C is 
true. If God freely brings it about that C is true, therefore, it follows, one might argue, only that 
God has the power to bring it about that C is false; it does not follow that he also has the power to 
bring it about that (I 1 is false. A similar point could be made concerning (6) above. If Smith freely 
brings it about that (6) is true and does so by flinging a rock through the window, it follows only 
that Smith has the power to refrain from t1inging the rock through the window; it does not follow 
that he has the power to bring it about that (6) is false. (I am indebted to an anonymous referee for 
Faith and Philosophy for a clear statement of the view described above. The quotation is from the 
referee's report.) 
I think it important to observe carefully, however, the implications of (PI) for each of these cases: 
the one where God brings it about that (1) is true and the one where Smith brings it about that (6) 
is true. Take the latter case first. If Smith brings it about that (6) is true and does so by flinging a 
rock through the window in question, it follows, given (PI)' only that in some possible world 
someone-God, for example-has tbe power to bring it about that (6) is false. And that is just what 
one would expect. If there are a variety of ditferent ways in which someone or other could bring it 
about that (6) is true, then it must be at least possible, one would think, that someone has the power 
to bring it about that (6) is false. And similarly for the former case. If God brings it about that (I) 
is true and does so by bringing it about the C is true, it follows, given (PI)' that in some possible 
world someone has the power to bring it about that (I) is false. In this case, however, no one other 
than God is even a plausible candidate for the possession of such power, and there seems to be no 
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reason to believe that God has such power in some worlds but not in others; so in this particular 
case, it follows, given (PI)' that God has the power to bring it about that (I) is true only if God 
has the power to bring it about that (I) is false. 
A related point is this. There are no doubt many possible worlds in which (6) is true and someone 
other than Smith brings it about that (6) is true, but there are none in which (I) is true and someone 
other than God brings it about that (I) is true. In every world, that is, it is God who guarantees that 
truth of (I); it is hardly surprising, therefore, that someone has the power to bring it about that (I) 
is false only if God has such power. 
5. Here I assume that any world which has the same history as the actual world (up to the present 
moment) is one in which God has indeed promised never again to destroy the earth with a Hood. 
That assumption could be challenged and has been challenged in an ingenious way by Flint and 
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